This paper examines the two externalities that a country's environmental regulation imposes on other country's welfare: an environmental externality, due to transboundary pollution, and, a competitive advantage externality, as regulations a¤ect domestic …rms'abatement costs, which impact the pro…ts of their foreign competitors. We …rst analyze the emission standards that countries independently set under di¤erent market structures and then compare them with the standards set under international environmental agreements that internalize one or both types of externalities. The paper hence disentangles the e¤ect of each externality. We show that …rms'pro…ts increase when countries participate in international treaties if the environmental damage from pollution is relatively low and such pollution is not signi…cantly transboundary. We hence demonstrate that international environmental agreements can serve as cooperative devices …rms use to ameliorate overproduction and increase pro…ts, without the need to form collusive agreements.
Introduction
Most pollution has a transboundary nature, since it a¤ects not only the country where it is produced but also neighboring countries. In order to control pollution, governments extensively use emission standards as an environmental policy. When countries independently select emission standards, however, they impose two external e¤ects on other countries'welfare. First, less stringent emission standards produce an environmental externality on other countries due to more pollution. Second, less strict environmental regulations can be used as a tool to support domestic …rms in their international competition. Speci…cally, countries have incentives to set relatively lax environmental policies that reduce national …rms'costs, increasing its pro…ts relative to foreign competitors. The negative e¤ect on foreign …rms'pro…ts can be understood as a "competitive advantage externality," or eco-dumping. International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) are commonly used to reduce emission standards, helping internalize the environmental externality associated to transboundary pollution. Nonetheless, IEAs can also be used to ameliorate the negative e¤ects of the competitive advantage externality. The bene…ts from IEAs would therefore be twofold: …rst, a mitigation of global pollution and, second, the control of eco-dumping.
In this paper we disentangle these bene…ts by analyzing two di¤erent market structures, where one or both of the external e¤ects are present. 1 First, we investigate a monopoly where the competitive advantage externality is absent since the domestic …rm does not face foreign competition.
Nonetheless, less strict emission standards in one country still impose an environmental externality on other countries, due to the transboundary nature of pollution. Second, we study the case of oligopolistic market structures, where a country's decision to relax the environmental standards to its national …rms imposes two types of negative externalities on other countries: environmental and competitive advantage externalities.
The paper examines the strategic incentives countries face when selecting their environmental policies by considering a two-stage game where, …rst, governments independently set their domestic environmental regulations, and second, every …rm decides its production level given the emission standards countries previously established. The presence of the aforementioned externalities induces countries to set lax environmental standards. In contrast, by participating in international treaties, countries are capable of internalizing one or both types of externalities. Speci…cally, when countries participate in an international agreement, they …rst jointly decide the emission levels to be included in the treaty, and second, …rms respond by choosing their output levels, given the commitments signed in the international agreement.
We show that emission standards under monopoly are higher than under oligopoly, both when countries independently set their emission levels and when they choose their environmental regulations within an IEA. The paper also analyzes countries' free-riding incentives under di¤erent market structures. Speci…cally, these incentives are de…ned as the di¤erence between the environmental standards every country independently selects and those when countries participate in international agreements that internalize either (or both) externalities. In particular, we show that countries' free-riding incentives are larger under monopoly than oligopoly, despite the fact that under monopoly only the environmental externality is present, while under oligopoly both types of externalities exist. Intuitively, more relaxed environmental regulations induce a larger increase in pro…ts for the monopolist than for the oligopolist. Countries with monopolistic …rms therefore set weakly higher emission levels than countries with …rms competing in an international oligopoly.
Besides countries' incentives to participate in international agreements, we investigate …rms' interests towards these treaties. Under monopoly markets, we demonstrate that the participation in an IEA only imposes a negative e¤ect on pro…ts since more stringent environmental standards increase the monopolist's abatement costs. However, under oligopoly markets, setting more stringent emission standards under the treaty imposes two e¤ects on pro…ts: a negative e¤ ect due to higher abatement costs, but also a positive e¤ ect, since stricter emission standards in all countries participating in the IEA reduce aggregate output (ameliorating overproduction in oligopoly).
Comparing the relative size of these e¤ects, we show that when the environmental damage is relatively high, countries set very stringent emission standards when participating in an international treaty. Under these conditions, lower emission levels impose a negative e¤ect on pro…ts that dominates the positive e¤ect. Therefore, oligopoly pro…ts are lower when countries participate in international agreements than when they do not, leading …rms to oppose their countries' participation in the international treaty. In contrast, when the environmental damage from emissions is relatively low, countries slightly reduce their emission standards under the treaty, which imposes a positive e¤ect on oligopoly pro…ts (due to the reduction in output) that outweighs the negative e¤ect that such environmental regulation imposes on costs. Hence, …rms would actually favor their countries' participation in IEAs. Intuitively, the emission standards countries set in international agreements serves as a cooperative device …rms use to ameliorate overproduction and increase pro…ts without the need to form collusive agreements. One example of …rms supporting IEAs is the "e-mission 55" initiative, where more than 200 companies from around the world are grouped to favor their countries' implementation of the Kyoto protocol. 2 Furthermore, we show that the set of environmental damages for which …rms support IEAs shrinks as pollution becomes more transboundary, i.e., the IEA is more stringent which induces a more signi…cant negative e¤ect on pro…ts. Finally, we demonstrate that …rms would favor countries' participation in IEAs that only internalize the environmental e¤ects of pollution under more general conditions than if the treaty internalizes both the environmental and competitive advantage externality.
We examine two extensions to our model. First, we analyze the case in which oligopolists form a cartel agreement, and investigate how countries' environmental regulation is a¤ected by …rms' decision to collude, both when countries independently set their domestic emission standards and when they participate in IEAs. Speci…cally, we show that countries'marginal bene…t from setting less stringent emission levels to domestic …rms are larger when …rms form a cartel than when they compete as oligopolists, ultimately inducing countries to set higher emission standards, both with and without IEAs. Hence, environmental regulation becomes "softer" when regulating …rms that belong to an international cartel, providing them with additional incentives to form such collusive agreements.
Second, we extend our model to the case in which countries take into account domestic consumer surplus. 3 We show that emission standards increase in the importance that countries assign to their consumers'welfare, both when countries do not participate in international treaties, and when they do. Furthermore, this result applies for di¤erent degrees of the transboundary externality, including the case where the environmental externality is absent.
Previous literature analyzes the environmental externality that local producers impose on a country's welfare when pollution is non-transboundary, how emission standards can serve to eliminate this externality, and how …rms' pro…ts are a¤ected under di¤erent market structures; see Maloney and McCormick (1982) , Ebert (1998) and Farzin (2003) . Similarly, previous studies examine the competitive advantage externality that results from countries independently selecting their environmental policies also assuming non-transboundary pollution. In particular, Kennedy (1994) examines countries'incentives to strategically set environmental taxes in a model with transboundary pollution. Barrett (1994a) analyzes countries'strategic incentives to set lax environmental regulations (both taxes and emission standards) to their domestic …rms under di¤erent market structures and non-transboundary pollution. Finally, Ulph (1996a) uses a similar approach to study how countries'strategic environmental regulations a¤ect …rms'previous investment decision in research and development. 4 Building upon this literature, we analyze the interaction between the environmental and competitive advantage externalities imposed on other countries. Speci…cally, this paper examines emission standards and …rms'equilibrium pro…ts when both externalities are present, and how countries'participation in IEAs that internalize one or both externalities might serve as a tool to reduce overproduction in oligopolistic market structures.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops the model, and section 3 describes …rms'equilibrium output during the second stage of the game, under di¤erent market structures. 3 Setting less stringent emission standards increases domestic output, which under oligopoly increases the consumer surplus not only of domestic but also of foreign buyers of the good. Hence, higher emission standards impose a new type of externality: namely, a positive "consumer surplus" externality on foreign countries; as described in section 6.2. 4 Multiple other studies analyze countries'strategic incentives when setting environmental regulations to domestic producers. For models where …rms' location is exogenous see Conrad (1993) , Ulph (1996b) , and Markusen et al. (1992 Markusen et al. ( , 1993 and for models in which …rm's location is an endogenous variable see Rauscher (1993) and Ulph (1994) .
In section 4, we analyze emission standards under monopoly markets, and how they are a¤ected by countries' participation in international agreements. Section 5 examines emission standards under oligopoly, and compares them with those under monopoly. Section 6 extends our model by analyzing cartel agreements and consumer surplus; and …nally we discuss the main results.
Model
Let us consider two countries which independently determine their environmental regulation and two …rms located in each country. In particular, every country i chooses the environmental standard that regulates the emissions from the …rm located in its jurisdiction. Pollution can either a¤ect the country where emissions were generated alone (non-transboundary emissions), or both the country that originally produced them and the foreign country (transboundary emissions). Similarly to Kennedy (1994) , let 0 be the emissions from country i that reach country j, producing an environmental externality. Note that if = 0 emissions from one country do not impose any environmental externality on the foreign country, as in Ulph (1996a) and in Barrett (1994a) , while if = 1 emissions are perfectly transboundary. Finally, > 1 represents the case where pollution imposes larger environmental damages on the foreign than on the domestic country.
In addition, assume that …rms are symmetric both in their production and abatement costs.
Production costs are q i , where a high parameter > 0 represents an e¢ cient production process.
Using an approach similar to Ulph (1996a) , let every unit of output q i be associated with one unit of pollution. Hence, the amount of pollution that …rm i must abate given the emission standard e i is A i q i e i represented by the di¤erence between the …rm's pollution (associated to output) and the emission standard to be observed. Intuitively, an emission standard is more stringent the lower the emission level e i is, since it induces the …rm to further abate its emissions. Following the functional forms used by Barrett (1994b) and Ulph (1996a) , let abatement costs be
i , which decrease as the …rm becomes more e¢ cient (higher ), and are increasing and convex in the abatement level, A i .
Assuming an inverse linear demand P (Q) = a Q, where Q denotes aggregate output, …rm's pro…ts are given by
It is easy to verify that the marginal cost of producing one additional unit of q i ,
is decreasing in e i , i.e., higher emission standards decrease …rms'marginal costs. We assume that demand satis…es a > 1 . 5 . Furthermore, …rm i is located in its corresponding country i, where the production process takes place, and where the transboundary pollutants are emitted. For completeness, we analyze two market structures: monopoly, whereby a single producer supplies a 5 This condition guarantees existence when …rms compete as Cournot oligopolists, as shown in the proof of Lemma 1, given that p(0) = a exceeds …rm's marginal costs of production at qi = 0, 1 4e i , for any emission standard ei 0.
good to the international market, and oligopoly, where …rms located in both countries sell the same product competing in quantities in the international market.
Finally, country i's social welfare is W i (q i ; q j ; e i ; e j ) = i (q i ; q j ; e i ) d (e i + e j ), which increases in …rm i's pro…ts and decreases in the environmental damage associated to domestic and foreign emissions. 6 The environmental damage of an additional unit of domestic emissions is d > 0, and that of foreign emissions is d > 0. In addition, note that pro…ts of …rm i only depend on the emission standards from country i when the …rm is a monopolist, whereas pro…ts depend on the emission levels set by both countries if it is an oligopolist. 7 The time structure of the game is as follows:
1. In the …rst stage of the game, every country i determines its own equilibrium emission standard. For comparison, we consider the following scenarios:
(a) Countries do not participate in an international environmental agreement. Hence, every country independently selects its own emission standard under no treaty, NT, e N T i ; (b) Countries participate in an international environmental treaty that reduces the environmental damage caused from transboundary pollution. Thus, emission standards selected under the environmental treaty internalize the environmental externality, EE, (e EE i ; e EE j ). (c) Countries participate in an international treaty that internalizes both types of externalities: the environmental externality and the competitive advantage externality. We refer to the emission standards that internalize both externalities as (e BE i ; e BE j ).
2. In the second stage of the game, given the emission standard set by every country, …rms choose their production levels q i (e i ; e j ) and q j (e j ; e i ), either as monopolists selling their products to separate international markets, or as oligopolists competing in the same international market.
Equilibrium Output
Let us describe …rms' production decision during the second stage of the game when they take emission standards as given. In particular, when …rms compete as oligopolists every …rm i's best response function is given by
0 otherwise 6 For simplicity, we assume that the marginal environmental damage from pollution, d, is constant in emission levels. Nonetheless, considering increasing marginal environmental damage would not qualitatively modify our results. 7 Similarly to Barrett (1994a) and Ulph (1996a), we initially assume that every …rm sells its production to the international market, and that consumers located in country i are a small share of all consumers in the international market. As a consequence, country i's social welfare does not include consumer surplus. This assumption is relaxed in section 6, where we investigate how emission standards are a¤ected by the weight that countries assign to consumer surplus (alternatively, such weight can be interpreted as the share of national customers in the international demand for the good). The qualitative results of the paper are una¤ected.
Speci…cally, q C i (q j ; e i ) is increasing in emission standard e i (producing an outward shift in …rm i's best response function). Intuitively, a higher environmental standard reduces …rm i's marginal costs, inducing it to produce larger amounts, which leads …rm j to produce lower output levels. Hence, setting less stringent emission standards serves as a strategic pre-commitment, as in Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) , a¤ecting …rms'competitiveness in the posterior stage of the game. 89 Next we analyze equilibrium output, both under monopolistic and oligopolistic markets.
Lemma 1. Equilibrium output under monopoly is q
, and under Cournot oligopoly is
if e i e i < e i , and
where e i Note that a less strict environmental regulation weakly increases …rm i's output, both under monopoly and under oligopoly, as …gure 1 illustrates. Oligopoly output is, however, more sensitive than monopoly output to a given increase in emission standards, e i . Intuitively, the monopolist fully takes into account the price decrease that results from producing a larger output, whereas the oligopolist does not fully internalize such price reduction. This leads the oligopolist to increase its production as a result of less strict emission standards more than the monopolist does. 8 In particular, this strategic setting corresponds to the "Top Dog" case in Fudenberg and Tirole's (1984) classi…-cation of strategic pre-commitment decisions. Brander and Spencer (1985) use a similar strategic setting to analyze governmental subsidy programs to exporters, improving their competitiveness with respect to foreign competitors. 9 Note that this result also holds for di¤erent demand and cost functions. In particular, it is satis…ed if every …rm's best response function when competing as a Cournot oligopolist is negatively sloped and experiences an upward shift when countries set less stringent environmental regulations to their domestic …rms.
Emission Standards under Monopoly
We next examine the …rst stage of the game in which countries set emission standards. In this section, we analyze the case where every country has a …rm that operates as a monopolist, selling its production to separate international markets. Regulating a monopoly only imposes an EE e¤ect on the welfare of other countries. It produces, however, no CAE e¤ects since less stringent environmental regulations in one country do not a¤ect foreign …rms' pro…ts (given its monopoly power). In the following section, we investigate emission standards under oligopoly, where both EE and CAE e¤ects are present.
Let us …rst examine countries' trade-o¤s from marginally increasing emissions. On the one hand, a marginal increase in the emission standard e i allowing …rms to emit more pollutants, has an associated marginal environmental cost of M EC i = d to country i, and a social marginal environmental cost of SM EC = (1 + )d to both countries, as depicted in …gure 2. On the other hand, a marginal increase in e i increases …rm's pro…ts. 10 In particular, the marginal bene…t of increasing e i under monopoly is Starting at e i = 0, a marginal increase in e i increases monopoly pro…ts by a relatively large amount, but the additional pro…ts from raising e i decrease as emissions standards become larger 
Emission Standards under treaty
This section analyzes the pair of emission standards that countries select when they participate in an international treaty. . In contrast, when pollution becomes more transboundary (higher ), the EE e¤ect is more signi…cant. Therefore, emission standards under the treaty become more stringent since they internalize larger environmental damages.
The di¤erence between emission standards without and with treaty, e M;N T i e M;EE i
, provides a measure about how much every country fails to fully internalize the environmental externality that it imposes on other countries. For simplicity, we denote this di¤erence as countries'free-riding behavior, given that countries do not consider the EE e¤ect that their independent environmental regulations impose on other countries. Speci…cally, under monopoly markets, larger, re ‡ecting the presence of a more signi…cant environmental externality. 11 
Emission Standards under Oligopoly
In this section, we analyze countries'emission standards when …rms compete as Cournot oligopolists in the international market. Using the equilibrium output chosen by these …rms in the second stage of the game, we examine countries'equilibrium regulations under no treaty, e C;N T i , under the treaty that internalizes the EE e¤ect, e
C;EE i
, and under the agreement that internalizes both externalities, e C;BE i . First, when countries participate in a treaty that internalizes the CAE e¤ect, they consider the negative externality they impose on foreign …rms. As a consequence, the marginal bene…t from setting higher emission standards when countries internalize both externalities, M B C;BE i (e i ; e j ), is lower than when they do not, M B C i (e i ; e j ), as …gure 3 below shows. Second, country i's marginal bene…t from increasing its own emission standards decreases in the emissions standards set by country j, both under no treaty and under either type of treaty. Intuitively, an increase in e j reduces the additional bene…ts that …rm i can obtain from less strict environmental regulations. Graphically, an increase in e j produces a parallel inward shift both in M B C i (e i ; e j ) and M B C;BE i (e i ; e j ). Third, the additional pro…ts from less strict emission standards are higher for the monopolist than that for the oligopolist, i.e., M B M i (e i ) M B C i (e i ; e j ) for given emission e i and e j . Speci…cally, a given increase in e i induces a larger increase in output for the oligopolist than for the monopolist, since the oligopolist does not fully internalize the price-e¤ect of its additional production. This causes a larger decrease in prices for the oligopolist than for the monopolist, ultimately reducing more the pro…ts from the former than from the latter. We next characterize equilibrium emissions 
Emission Standards under treaty
Let us investigate countries' emissions standards when their agreement internalizes the environmental externality, e
C;EE i
, and when it internalizes both externalities, EE and CAE, e Similarly to monopoly, the internalization of the EE e¤ect under oligopoly weakly reduces emission standards, from e C;N T i to e
, and this reduction is increasing in the extent of the transboundary externality, . The following corollary describes the ranking among emission levels, under di¤erent market structures, with and without IEAs. . Therefore, the above corollary establishes a complete ranking among all emission levels, where emission standards under monopoly are weakly higher than under oligopoly for all treaty/no treaty scenario, as the …gures below illustrate. Intuitively, the marginal bene…t from setting less stringent environmental standards to a monopolist is higher than that to an oligopolist, which leads countries to set less stringent environmental regulations to the former than to the latter. Figure   4 , additionally, represents the reduction in emission standards under di¤erent treaties, and for a given market structure K = fM; Cg: …rst, when countries only internalize the EE e¤ect (reducing emissions from e K;N T i to e K;EE i ), and second, when countries internalize both the EE and CAE e¤ects 12 (weakly decreasing emissions to e
C;BE i
).
1 2 The emission standard under an international treaty that internalizes both types of externalities coincides with the Pareto optimal pair of emission standards. That is, given countries'social welfare function, there is no other pair of emission standards for which one of the countries could be made better o¤ without reducing the social welfare of another country. , which measures the deviation of the emission standard under no treaty from that only internalizing the EE e¤ect. As …gure 5 indicates, F R C;BE , is larger than F R C;EE . Furthermore, the distance in emission standards is weakly larger under monopoly than oligopoly. This implies that allowing countries to independently set environmental regulations to their national monopolists leads them to larger environmental ine¢ ciencies, relative to the optimal level of emission standards. Nonetheless, when the environmental damage is su¢ ciently high, the di¤erence in emission standards is zero, both under oligopoly and monopoly. Furthermore note that emission standards under monopoly and oligopoly do not respond similarly to a given increase in demand. We analyze this property in the following corollary.
Corollary 2. For a given increase in market demand, emission standards under monopoly increase more than under oligopoly, for a given treaty/no treaty scenario.
Emission standards under monopoly are, hence, more responsive to a given increase in demand than emission standards under oligopoly. Importantly, this result holds both when countries do not participate in international agreements, and when they do (either considering the EE e¤ect, or both the EE and CAE e¤ects).
Firms'pro…ts
Let us now examine how countries'participation in international agreements a¤ects …rms'pro…ts.
Under monopoly markets, countries set more stringent emission standards when participating in international agreements, reducing their pro…ts. Speci…cally, because monopolists fully internalize the price e¤ect of their production decision, countries'participation in IEAs reduce …rms'pro…ts, relative to no treaty. Under oligopoly markets, however, …rms do not fully internalize the price e¤ect of their output decisions. This leaves room for environmental regulations to serve as a cooperative device …rms use to ameliorate overproduction in oligopoly and increase pro…ts without the need to form collusive agreements. The next proposition analyzes under which conditions …rms'equilibrium pro…ts can actually increase as a result of countries'participation in international agreements. Participation in international agreements induces countries to reduce their emission standards, which imposes two e¤ects on …rms'pro…ts. First, a negative e¤ ect, since more stringent emission standards increase …rms'abatement costs, which raises their marginal cost of production. Second, it provides a positive e¤ ect on pro…ts, since lower emission standards lead …rms to lower production levels, increasing pro…ts.
The relative size of the two e¤ects depends, nonetheless, on the environmental damage of pollution. In particular, when environmental damage is relatively low, IEAs induce countries to moderately reduce their emission levels. A reduction in both countries'emission standards induces a positive e¤ect on …rms'pro…ts that outweighs the negative e¤ect, ultimately increasing pro…ts.
When environmental damage is relatively high, however, countries set stringent emission standards under the treaty. A signi…cant decrease in emission standards now decreases …rms'pro…ts, because the positive e¤ect is counterbalanced by the negative e¤ect that more stringent environmental regulation imposes on …rms'pro…ts. their countries' participation in IEAs which internalize the EE e¤ect, or both external e¤ects, respectively. 13 Furthermore, the fact that d BE < d EE implies that the set of environmental damages for which …rms support their countries' participation in IEAs that internalize the EE e¤ect, d < d EE , is larger than those in treaties internalizing both the EE and CAE e¤ects, d < d EE .
Additionally, both cuto¤s are decreasing in , representing that the maximal environmental damage for which …rms favor IEAs shrinks as pollution becomes more transboundary. Intuitively, more transboundary pollution leads to more stringent treaties, increasing the aforementioned negative e¤ect on pro…ts. As a consequence, …rms support IEAs if and only if the environmental damage from pollution is relatively low and such pollution is not signi…cantly transboundary. Finally, both cuto¤s are increasing in market demand, a, since higher demand increases the positive e¤ect that more stringent environmental standards produces on …rms'pro…ts.
Extensions

Cartel agreements
Let us brie ‡y consider countries'environmental regulations if the two oligopolists form a cartel.
Proposition 6. Emission standards are less stringent when oligopolists form a cartel than when they compete in quantities, for a given NT/EE/BE scenario. In addition, e Intuitively, the increase in pro…ts resulting from a marginal increase in emission standards is larger for a …rm participating in a cartel agreement than for a Cournot oligopolist. This induces countries to set less strict emission standards to the former than to the latter, both when countries participate in international treaties and when they do not.
In particular, …rm's pro…ts are higher under the cartel agreement than under Cournot competition for a given environmental regulation. However, environmental regulation does not remain constant when …rms collude, relative to when they compete in quantities. Instead, emission standards become less stringent, thus further increasing the pro…ts of the …rms participating in the cartel. Countries therefore become "softer" when regulating a domestic …rm that belongs to an international cartel. Hence, environmental policy does not necessarily reduce the market power of the cartel, but rather, provides additional incentives to oligopolists to form cartel agreements in order to face less stringent environmental regulations. Finally, and similarly to our previous results, countries' environmental regulations become weakly more stringent when they sign international agreements that internalize either the EE e¤ect alone, or both the EE and CAE e¤ects.
Consumer surplus
Let us now consider the case in which the population of every country i represents a (non-negligible) share > 0 of the international demand for the good. Under this assumption, governments consider national consumer surplus when determining emission standards, both with and without international treaties. In particular, country i's social welfare becomes W i ( ) = CS(q i ; q j ) + i (q i ; q j ; e i ) d(e i + e j ). Under oligopolistic markets, a given increase in emission standards by country i imposes, in addition to the EE and CAE e¤ects, a positive externality on other countries due to the increase in consumer surplus resulting from larger production levels (and lower prices) that are not only enjoyed by domestic but also by foreign consumers of the good. This consumer surplus externality is present under oligopoly but not under monopoly, since producers sell their product in separate international markets.
We assume, however, that the positive e¤ect of the consumer surplus externality does not dominate the negative e¤ect of the EE and CAE externalities. That is, less stringent emission standards from one country still impose an overall negative externality on other countries'welfare 14 , and for this reason international treaties prescribe a reduction in emission levels. 15 We denote the international treaty that internalizes the three types of externalities by the superscript TE. Hence, as countries assign a larger importance to their national consumer surplus, they set less strict environmental regulations to its corresponding …rm in order to induce larger production levels (and lower prices). This result holds both for the case in which countries do not participate in international agreements, and in the case they do. 16 Alternatively, weight could be interpreted as consumer's representation in the political process that determines emission standards. Under this interpretation, a larger political representation of consumers'interests would favor higher emission standards. Finally, note that we consider to be exogenous. However, …rms might have incentives to spend resources into lobbying activities in order to increase the weight that policymakers assign to consumers'welfare, strategically inducing less stringent emission standards (as shown in proposition 7). 1 4 For simplicity, we assume that < 2, which guarantees that the negative externalities from higher emissions (EE and CAE) dominate the positive consumer surplus externality. This assumption still allows countries to assign di¤erent weights to their consumers' welfare, either higher or lower than the importance countries assign to their domestic …rm's pro…ts, if > 1 and < 1, respectively. 1 5 Note that, otherwise, less stringent emission standards from one country would impose an overall positive externality on other countries'welfare, and therefore international agreements should call for an increase in countries' emissions. 1 6 Our results extend to other social welfare functions in which countries assign di¤erent weights to consumer surplus, pro…ts and environmental damage from pollution. Speci…cally, the results hold when emissions standards are strategic substitutes, i.e., more stringent standards in one country lead other countries to relax the equilibrium emission levels they set to domestic producers. Therefore, emission standards maintain their nature of global public goods.
Conclusions
This paper analyzes two externalities that domestic environmental regulation imposes on foreign countries'welfare -environmental and competitive advantage externalities-under di¤erent market structures. In particular, under monopoly only environmental externalities are present, whereas under oligopoly both types of externalities exist. The paper hence disentangles the e¤ect of these externalities.
We compare emission standards independently selected by every country with respect to those they choose as members of an international environmental agreement, internalizing one or both types of externalities. The paper demonstrates that emission standards countries sign in international treaties that consider both types of externalities are weakly lower than those internalizing only one externality. Furthermore, we show that …rms'pro…ts increase as a result of countries'participation in international agreements if the environmental damage from pollution is su¢ ciently low and pollution is not signi…cantly transboundary. Hence, …rms would actually favor their countries' participation in IEAs under certain conditions. This result provides an additional bene…t from environmental agreements: to serve as a cooperative tool oligopolists use to mitigate overproduction and increase pro…ts, without the need to form collusive agreements.
The paper assumes that oligopolists are symmetric in their cost structure. The model could be modi…ed to consider the case in which …rms are asymmetric. In such case, environmental regulation would not coincide across countries, both if countries participate in an IEA and if they do not.
Asymmetric environmental regulations in equilibrium might induce …rms to shift their production decision towards those countries with the least stringent emission standards. This could promote, for instance, acquisitions of …rms located in countries with di¤erent environmental regulations, thus modifying the market structure.
Information about production costs is common knowledge among other …rms and countries.
In a di¤erent model, however, every …rm would be privately informed about its marginal production costs, but not about rivals' costs. In contrast, governments might have relatively accurate information about their domestic …rms'marginal costs after years of regulation. In this context, a government's environmental regulation to domestic …rms signals information about the e¢ ciency of national …rms to their foreign competitors, which a¤ects their entry decision.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Di¤erentiating the monopolist's pro…t with respect to q i and solving for q i we obtain the monopolist output as a function of emission standard e i ,
In the case that …rms i and j compete in quantities, …rm i's best response function is,
Note that, …rst, when
e i ) we have that
and q C j = 0 (graphically, …rms' best response functions intersect at the vertical intercept). Second, when
(in this case, …rms' best response functions intersect at the horizontal intercept). Third, when
, if e i < e i < e i ), we have that
(interior solution), which is positive if and only if e i < e i , which is satis…ed since e i < e i < e i . Therefore, equilibrium output when …rms compete a la Cournot is
Note that existence of the Cournot equilibrium is satis…ed: …rst, the inverse demand curve satis…es p(0) = a, which exceeds the marginal cost evaluated at q i = 0, 1 4e i . Second, …rm j's best response function, q C j (q i ), evaluated at q i = 0, a 1+4e i , exceeds the monopoly output a 1+4e i 2(2+ ) , which holds for all parameter values. In addition, uniqueness of the Cournot equilibrium output is also satis…ed since the absolute value of the slope of every …rm's best response function, 2(2+ ) , is lower than one for all parameter values.
In the case where both countries set symmetric emission standards in the …rst stage of the game, e i = e j , we have that 
Proof of Proposition 1
Every country i maximizes its own social welfare by selecting e i :
where i q M i (e i ); e i represents …rm i's equilibrium pro…ts under monopoly, for a given emission standard e i . Di¤erentiating with respect to e i we obtain, where
Proof of Proposition 2
When countries maximize their joint welfare (internalizing both externalities, BE), they select e i and e j such that,
di¤erentiating with respect to e i we obtain,
and similarly for e j . Solving for e i we have, 
Proof of Proposition 3
When every country independently sets e i then,
where i (q C i (e i ; e j ); e i ) denotes …rm i's equilibrium pro…ts under oligopoly, for emission standards e i and e j . Di¤erentiating with respect to e i ,
where the …rst two terms represent the marginal bene…t from setting less stringent emission standards to …rm i, M B C i . In particular,
where
[128+ (160+ (64+9 ))] , and similarly for country j. Solving for e i we obtain e i (e j ). By symmetry, we simultaneously solve for e i and e j to obtain 
Proof of Proposition 4
When countries internalize the EE e¤ect, country i selects e i to maximize, When countries internalize both types of externalities, they choose e i and e j in order to maximize their joint welfare, max e i ;e j i (q C i (e i ; e j ); e i ) d(e i + e j ) + j (q C j (e i ; e j ); e j ) d(e j + e i ) di¤erentiating with respect to e i ,
, and in particular,
M B
C;BE i = , and similarly for country j. Solving for e i and e j and applying symmetry, Finally, note that the di¤erence between the two cuto¤s identi…ed in this proof,
is decreasing in , and becomes zero at =
2(48+48 +9
2 ) 32+36 +9
parameter values.
Proof of Proposition 6
If both oligopolists form a cartel in which they choose q i and q j in order to maximize their joint pro…ts,
(e i ; e j ) = 
Proof of Proposition 7
First note that …rms'maximization problem is una¤ected, relative to the case in which consumer surplus was not considered. Hence, for given emission standards e i and e j , both monopoly output q M i (e i ) and oligopoly output q C i (e i ; e j ) coincide with that speci…ed in Lemma 1. Let us next examine equilibrium emission standards. which is positive by de…nition since < 2 < 2 + . , which is satis…ed by assumption since < 2 <
48+ (44+9 ) 24+10
. Second, e , which holds by de…nition since < 2 <
. Second, e C;EE i is weakly increasing in given that 
